IMYGATT vs. THE CITY OF GREEN BAY.

the corporation from its appropriate liabilities. A certain authority
indeed is committed to it as trustee for the public, but there are concurrent duties. And when it goes forth into the world to accomplish
its own ends, it leaves this character behind. It is then, in all respects,
a private company, to be treated as its own conduct, measured by
the accustomed rules of law, shall require.
In this way no rights are sacrificed: neither those of the public,
of the company, nor of individuals. The maxim in the motto has
not proved false, for we see jus privatum sub jure publico tutum.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

In the District Court of the United States for the District of
Wisconsin.
ELI MYGATT & GEORGE MYGATT VS. THE CITY OF GREEN BAY.
1. The holder of a city bond issued to a plank road company or bearer, issued in aid
of the construction of the road in pursuance of a legislative act, is not bound to
examine the records of the city to ascertain whether the resolution of the council
for issuing the bonds corresponds with the resolution recited in the bonds. That
recital binds the city.
2. Where city bonds are issued to a corporation or road company, payable in the
city of New York, without express authority of law to make them so payable; the
bonds are not void for this reason, but the city is -not bound to transport funds to
New York for their contract.
3. The act under which the bonds are issued is the basis of the contract; and dealers
in such bonds are chargeable with notice of the act, it being a public statute.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-An act of the State legislature to amend the charter
of the town of Green Bay, and to enable the corporation to aid in
the construction of roads, approved March 7th, 1853, provided that
the corporation of said town shall be hereafter known and styled
thepresident and trustees of the borough of Green Bay. Section
2d of said act is, "that the president and trustees of said borough
shall have authority to subscribe in behalf of said borough, to the
capital stock of any rail or plank road, which is now, or may thereafter be incorporated for the-purpose of constructing roads passing

MYGATT vs. THE CITY OF GREEN BAY.

through, or terminating, in said town, or on the Fox river opposite
said borough, to the amount of one hundred thousand dollars. And
by section 3, "in order to provide for the payment of the instalments on the stock subscribed as aforesaid, the said president and
trustees may borrow, on the faith of said borough, any sum or sums
of money not exceeding in the aggregate the whole amount of the
instalments to become due on such stock, at a rate of interest not
exceeding eight per cent. per annum, and for a term not exceeding
twenty years. And in order to provide for the payment of the
instalments becoming due on such stock, in case the same shall not
have been provided for by law, or otherwise; and also in order to
provide for the payment of the interest and principal of any loan
made in pursuance of this act, the said president and trustees shall
levy annually a tax on the real estate within the corporated limits
of said borough not exceeding one per cent. on the assessed value of
said property. Provided, That if in any year the exigency of the
case may require it, such tax may be increased to any rate not
exceeding two per cent. on such assessed value." By an act to
incorporate the Taychudah and Green Bay Plank Road Company,
approved April 16th, 1852, that company was incorporated; the
city of Green Bay was incorporated by an act approved February
27th, 1854. By this act the city was made liable for the debts of
the borough.
This suit is on bonds of the borough of Green Bay, for the recovery
of the interest accrued, according to their condition ani coupons
annexed. The bonds recite the authority given the president and
trustees, by the act of March 7th, 1853, to subscribe stock. And
also, "whereas, the president and trustees of said borough at a
meeting of their board, did agree by resolutions of said board to
subscribe the sum of twenty thousand dollars to the stock of the
Taychudah and Green Bay Plank Road Company, and that the said
borough issue bonds to the amount of said subscription, to the said
plank road company, and that said bonds be signed by the president
and countersigned by the clerk, under the seal of the corporation.
Now therefore, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the
said act of the legislature, and in accordance with the resolutions of
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the said board, as aforesaid. The borough of Green Bay is held
and firmly bound unto the Taycheedai and Green Bay Plank Road
Company, or bearer, in two thousand dollars, upon the condition
that the said borough of Green Bay shall pay, or cause to be paid
to the said Taycheedah and Green Bay Plank Road Company, or their
successors or assigns, or to the bearer hereof, the just and full sum
of one thousand dollars in ten years from the first day of January
1854, with interest annually at the rate of eight per cent. per annum
until paid; said principal and interest to be paid at the Bank of
New York, in the city of New York. The coupons annexed are
for eighty dollars each; the annual interest is payable at the Bank of
New York. The bonds are signed by the president of the borough,
and countersigned by the clerk, under the corporate seal. The
coupons are signed by the president. The following resolution of
the board on the 19th of November, 1853, was allowed to be read on
the part of the defendant, subject to the objection of immateriality.
"That the board of trustees of the borough of Green Bay, hereby
authorize their committee on subscriptions to subscribe the sum of
twenty thousand dollars to the capital stock of the Green Bay and
Taycheedah Plank Road Cpmpany, payable in bonds of the borough
at seven per cent. per annum, under the- act authorizing the said
borough of Green Bay to subscribe to plank roads and rail roads."
One terminus of the road was at Green Bay. The defendants
counsel offered to prove, that the contractor received seventeen of
these bonds, and that he had only made three miles of road, at a
distance of sixteen miles from Green Bay; which offer was overruled
as immaterial. A verdict was taken pro forma for the amount of
coupons due before suit brought, not adding exchange on New York.
The defendants counsel moved for a new trial, which, after argument,
I have now to consider.
The two questions worthy of consideration, raised on this motion, are
1. That the resolution of the board did not authorize the issuing
of the bonds at a rate of interest higher than seven per cent.
2. That the act did not authorize bonds to be issued payable in
the city of New York.
18
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The resolution of the board of trustees, recited in the bonds, does
not correspond with the resolution in the minutes, excepting in this,
that twenty thousand dollars of stock in the company is authorized
to be subscribed for, and that bonds be issued for the amount:
There is no rate of interest recited in the bonds as prescribed by
the resolution, and the recital refers to a resolution directing how
the bonds shall be executed. The clerk testified that there was no
other resolution of the board on record but the one. It may be that
there was another resolution that was not recorded. At all events
it is immaterial, in this suit of the holders of the bonds, whether
there was a resolution of the board of trustees recorded, authorizing
the issuing of the bonds as issued, or not. The city cannot take
advantage, in this suit, of the omission or neglect of the clerk. The
recital in the bonds binds the borough the same as if a previous
resolution had been passed by the president and trustees, and duly
recorded. The city is now estopped from denying the existence
of a resolution authorizing the president and clerk to execute bonds
in the form of these bonds, at an interest of eight per cent. The
orMmis8ioner8
purchaser was not bound-to look for the resolution.
of Knox Co. vs. Aspinwall, 21 Howard,.539. I e Bank vs. Tarquand, 6 Ellis & Blackburn, 327. The bonds are the acts of the
trustees directly, and not through agents.
The weight of authority sustains the principle, that when an obligation is payable at a particular place, and is necessarily sued at a
place where the exchange is in favor of the place of payment, the
party is entitled to recover the real difference of exchange. See
Story's Conflict of Laws, §§ 308 to 313, and cases cited. Story on
Bills of Exchange, §§ 150, 151, 152, and cases cited. Sedgewick on
Dam. 240, and cases cited; Smith vs. Shaw, 2 Wash. C. C. Rep.
167, 168; Grant vs. Healy, 3 Sumner, C. C. Rep. 523; Lanuse
vs. Barker, - Wheat. 101, 147; Woodhali vs. Wagner, 1 Bald.
Rep. 2905 309 ; Lee vs. Wileock8, 5 S. & R. 48. And in Wood vs.
Zelso, 27 Pa. State Rep. (2 Casey) 241, a suit on.a note dated in
Erie, Pennsylvania, payable in New York, the exchange was allowed.
The decisions against the allowance of exchange are Martin vs.
Franklin,4 Johns. 125, which was an action of assumpsit for goods
sold and delivered, and insimUl Comyutasset. Scofield vs. DaDy, 20
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Johns. 102. It will be observed, that the court in each of those
cases contented themselves with a per curiam opinion, without any
examination of authorities or precedents. And also Adams vs.
Cordis, 8 Pick. 260. These bonds would, on their face, entitle the
holders to the real exchange between Green Bay and New York, in
addition to the debt and interest.
The legislative act authorized the president and trustees of the
borough of Green Bay, "to borrow on the faith of said borough, at
a rate of interest not exceeding eight per cent. per annum. The
condition of the bonds is for the payment of the principal and interest at the rate of eight per cent, at the Bank of New York, in the
city of New York. The act did not expressly authorize the issuing
of bonds; but it is reasonable to suppose it was contemplated that
some security, or evidence of debt, should be given by the president and
trustees for the money borrowed. The bonds were given to the
company for stock subscribed; and according to the modern system
of financiering, they were put into negotiable shape, so that
money could be raised on them for the prosecution of the work.
By the law, the principal and interest on th~se bonds are to be paid
out of taxes assessed upon the real estate of the inhabitants of
Green Bay.
In the case of the Commissfoners of Knox County vs. Aspinwall,

21 Howard, 539, the act authorized bonds to be issued, redeemable
at such time and place as the directors of the company may determine. The bonds were made payble in the city of New York, to
the Ohio and Mississipi Railroad Company or bearer, for stock in
said company. There was express lawful authority for issuing these
bonds. These bonds, on their face, impart a compliance with the
law under which they were issued.
"The act under which the bonds were issued is a public statute
of the State, and the person dealing in them is chargeable with a
knowledge of it; and as the board was acting under delegated
authority, he must show that the authority has been properly conferred." In reading the act under which the bonds in suit purport
to be issued, he will not find express authority to issue bonds, nor
any authority, express or implied, to issue them payable in the city of
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New York, where the exchange is uniformly against Green Bay.
The purchaser of these bonds might properly consider them nothing
more than a certificate under the corporate seal of the borough,
signed by the president, and countersigned by the clerk. They are
in substance nothing more.
The borough of Green Bay, instead of borrowing money to pay
instalments on the stock, issued bonds direct to the plank road company. The company thus became the creditor of the borough,
instead of some person from whom the money might have been borrowed; and it received the bonds as cash, in payment of the subscription. It was attempted to be proved at the trial, that the
borough never received the certificates of stock, but that proof was
not to be received to affect the bonds in the hands of these plaintiffs,
for the neglect of the corporation in not obtaining the certificates,
could not be a -reason for not pa'ying the bonds. The city is entitled
to the certificates of stock, for which the bonds were given, and can
recover them, or damages for their amount, on demand. .
Giving the bonds to the plank road company cannot be now made
an objection -on the part of the city; even if it was not according
to the literal terms of the act. The borough preferred this mode of
carrying out the provisions of the act; and either received an
equivalent, or a supposed equivalent for the bonds ; or is entitled so
to receive it on demand., Under the act it could have borrowed
the money, and paid upon the subscription in instalments ; or paid
the whole amount in advance, or given its bonds for the whole
amount. Either proceeding would be a substantial compliance with
the act. And having preferred the latter mode, a defence to the
payment of the bonds and interest, based upon technical grounds, is
not to be favored.
In the case of the City of Bridgeport vs. The Housatonic Bailroad Company, 15 Connecticut Rep. 475, the bonds were made
payable in-the city of New York, without express authority of law.
That was not made a point of defence. The defence was, that the
interest on the bonds was payable semi-annually, when it was directed to be paid annually. The court held that this was not such a
material violation of the authority for issuing the bonds, as to invali-
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date them; particularly as the freemen of the city afterwards
approved them. The rate of exchange between New York and
Bridgeport, was probably so nearly balanced, and the expenses of
transporting the money to New York so trifling, that this objection was
probably not considered worthy of consideration.
A note payable generally is a different instrument from one given
by the same parties for the same amount, payable at Now York.
The rate of interest, the exchange, and the place of demand, are
controlled by the place where it is payable. Nor -will a note payable at a particular place be received in evidence on a declaration,
in which the place of payment is omitted. iSebree vs. Dorr, 9 Wheat.
558 ; Covington vs. Comstock, 14 Peters, 43. In this case the rate
of interest is prescribed in the bond. And no demand is necessary.
But the rate of exchange between Green Bay and New York, or the
expense of transporting funds from Green Bay to New York, is so
considerable in amount, as greatly to enhance the amount of debt.
It is evident, that the act did not authorize the loans or debt to be
contracted on this condition. But shall the bonds be adjudged void
for this reason? It was the duty of the plaintiffs to examine the
act, and there they would not see any authority for contracting the
loan or debt on this condition.
After much reflection upon the subject, I have come to the conclusion, that the interest on the bonds is recoverable; but not with
exchange on New York, as the act did not authorize the loan or
debt to be contracted on that condition. The act controls the extent
of the obligation. That part of the condition of the bonds is not
binding on the city, as a part of the contract under the act; and
the property in the city should not be taxed for its payment. The
holder of such bonds and coupons, cannot require the city of Green
Bay to pay in the city of New York. I think the bonds a lawful
debt of the city, with annual interest at the rate of eighit per cent.
The motion for a new trial will be overruled.

RICHARDSON ET AL -vs GODDARD ET AL.

In the Supreme Court of the United States, December, 1859.
OHARLES RICHARDSON ET AL., CLAIMANTS OF THE BARQUE CcTANGIER,"
APPELLANTS, vs. DAVID GODDARD ET AL.
1. Where the barque Tangier had arrived in the harbor of Boston on the 5th of
April, with a cargo of cotton, and commenced to discharge her cargo on Monday,
the seventh, and on the same day the master gave the consignees notice of her
readiness to deliver, and the wharf was filled with the bales, which were not taken
away by the consignees; a second notice was given on Tuesday, the eighth, to
the consignees, and on Wednesday morning a third notice; on Thursday the
remaining bales were unladen and placed on the 'wharf, the consignees carted
away five bales, and postponed taking the rest until the next day, assigning as a
reason that Thursday was "Past Day" by public proclamation; and in the afternoon of that day, the cotton remaining on the wharf was consumed by an accidental fire: Held, reversing the decree of the Circuit Court, that the delivery was
a good delivery to the consignees, and that the loss by fire could not be imposed
upon the barque.
2. A carrier by water carries from port to port, or from wharf to 'wharf, and is not
bound to deliver at the warehouse of the consignee;. and it is the duty of the
consignee to receive the goods out of the ship, or on the wharf; but to constitute
a valid delivery, the carrier must give due and reasonable notice to the consignee, so as to afford him a fair opportunity of removing the goods, or placing
them in safe custody.
3. In the port of Boston there 'is no general custom or usage engrafted into the
maritime law, and making a part thereof, which forbids the unlading of vessels
and a tender of freight to the consignees, on the day set apart for a church festival, fast, or holiday.
4. Holidays do seem to be favored in commercial law. The subject of holidays
discussed historically, and as matter ofjudicial decision.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Distriet of Massachusetts.1 The opinion of the court was delivered by
GRIER, J.-The barque "Tangier, a foreign vessel in the port of
Boston," is charged in the libel with a failure to deliver certain'
bales of cotton, according to her contract of affreightment. The
answer admits the contract, and alleges a full compliance with it,
by a delivery of the cargo on the wharf; and that after such
delivery a part of the cargo .was consumed by fire, before it was
removed by the consignees..
1 The reader will find the opinion of the Circuit Court in this case,
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The libellants amended their libel, admitting the receipt.of 163
bales, and setting forth, as a reason for not receiving and taking
away from the wharf that portion of the cargo which was unladen
on Thursday, "that, by the appointment of the governor of Massachusetts, that day was kept and regarded by the citizens as ' a day
of fasting, humiliation, and prayer,' and that from time immemorial
it has been the usuage and custom to abstain from all secular work
on that day ;" and consequently, that the libellants were not bound
to receive the cargo on that day; and that such a delivery, without
their consent or agreement, is not a delivery, or offer to deliver, in
compliance with the terms of the bill of lading.
Three questions of law were raised on the trial of this case
below:
1. Whether the master is exempted from liability for a loss occacasioned by an accidental fire, after the goods are deposited on the
wharf, by the act of congress of March 3d, 1851.
2d. Whether the master is liable, under the circumstances of this
case, for the loss of the cotton, on the general principles of the
maritime law, excluding the fact of fast day..
3d. If not, whether the right of the carrier to continue the discharge of his cargo is affected by the fact that the governor had
appointed that day as a general fast day.
As our decision of the second and third of these points will dispose of this case, we do not think it necessary to express any opinion
on the first.
We will first inquire whether there was such a delivery of cargo
in this case as should discharge the carrier under the contract of
affreightment, irrespective of the peculiar character of the day.
The facts in evidence, as far as they are material to the correct
decision of this point, are briefly as follows:
The barque Tangier arrived in the port of Boston on the 5th of
April, with a cargo of cotton, intending to discharge at Battery
wharf; but at the request of the consignees, and for their convenience, she "hauled up" at Lewis's wharf. She commenced the
discharge of her cargo on Monday, the seventh, and on the same
day the master gave notice to the consignees of his readiness to
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deliver the goods. The unlading was commenced in the afternoon,
and was continued through the forenoon of Tuesday, when, the cotton not being removed, the wharf became so full that the work was
suspended. Notice was again given to the consignees; and they
still neglecting to remove their cotton, a third notice was added on
Wednesday morning. On the afternoon of that day, all the cotton
which had been unladen on Monday and Tuesday, was removed,
excepting 325 bales, which remained on the wharf over night. On
Thursday morning the wharf was so far cleared that the unlading
was completed by one o'clock, P. M. On that day the libellants
took away about five bales, and postponed taking the rest till the
next day, giving as a reason that it was fast day. About three
o'clock of this day the cotton remaining on the wharf was consumed
or damaged by an accidental fire.
The contract of the carrier in this case is "to deliver in like good
order and condition, at the port of Boston, unto Goddard & Pritchard."
What constitutes a good delivery, to satisfy the exigency of such
a contract, will depend on the known and established usages of the
particular trade, and the well-known usages of the port in which the
delivery is to be made.
A carrier by wagon may be bound to deliver his freight at the
warehouse of the consignee; carriers by railroad and canal usually
deliver at warehouses belonginig to themselves or others. Where the
contract is to carry -by sea, from port to port, an actual or manual
tradition of the goods into the possession of the consignee, or at his
warehouse, is not required in order to discharge the carrier from his
liability as such.
There is no allegation of a particular custom as to the mode and
place of delivery, peculiar to the city of Boston, which the carrier
has not complied with. The general usages of the commercial and
maritime -law, as settled by judicial decisions, must therefore be
applied to the case. By these it is well settled, that the carrier by
water shall carry from port to port or from wharf to wharf. He is
not bound to deliver at the warehouse of the consignee ; it is the
duty of the consignee to receive the goods out of the ship or on the
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wharf. But to constitute a valid delivery on the wharf, the carrier
should give due and reasonable notice to the consignee, so as to afford
him a fair opportunity of providing suitable means to remove the
goods, or put them under proper care and custody.
Such a delivery, to be effectual, should not only be at the proper
place, which is usually the wharf, but at a proper time. A carrier who would deposit goods on a wharf at night, 6r on Sunday,
and abandon them without a proper custodian, before the consignee had proper time and opportunity to take them into his
possession and care, would not fulfil the obligation of his contract.
When goods are not accepted by the consignee, the carrier should
put them in a place of safety; and when he has so done, he is
no longer liable on his contract of affreightment.
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, it is clear that
(saving the question as to the day) the respondents are not liable
on their contract of affreightment for the loss of the goods in question. They delivered the goods at the place chosen by the consignees, and where they agreed to receive them, and did receive a
large portion of them, after full and fair notice.
The goods were deposited:for the consignees in proper order and
condition, at mid-day, on a week day, in good weather. This undoubtedly constituted a good delivery ; and the carriers are clearly
not liable on their contract of affreightment, unless, by reason of the
fact next to be noticed, they were restrained from unlading their
vessel and tendering delivery on that day.
I. This inquiry involves the right of the carrier to labor on
that day, and discharge cargo, and not the right of the consignee
tb keep a voluntary holiday, and to postpone the removal of the
goods to his warehouse to a more convenient season. The policy of
the law holds the carrier to a rigorous liability; and in the discharge of it he is not bound to await the convenience or accommodate himself to the caprice or conscientious scruples of the consignee. The master of a ship usually has a certain number of
lay-days. He is bound to expedite the unlading of his vessel, in
order to relieve the owners from the expense of demurrage, and
To liberate the ship from the onerous libability of the contract of
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affreightment as soon as possible. He has six days of the week in
which to perform this task, and has a right to demand the acceptance of his freight by the consignee. The consignee may think it
proper to keep Saturday as his Sabbath, and to observe Friday as a
fast day, or other church festival, or he may postpone the removal of
the goods because his warehouse is not in order to receive them; but
he cannot exercise his rights at the expense of others, and compel
the carrier to stand as insurer of his property, to suit his convenience
or his conscience.
Let us inquire then, 1st, whether there is any law of the State of
Massachusetts which forbids the transaction of business on the day in
question ; 2dly. If not, is there any general custom or usage ingrafted
into the commercial or maritime law, and making a part thereof,
which forbids the unlading of vessels and a tender of freight to the
consignee on the day set apart for a church festival, fast, or holiday;
and 3dly. If not, is there any special custom in the port of Boston
which prohibits the carrier from unlading his vessel on such a day,
and compels him to observe it as a holiday.
1. There is no statute of Massachusetts which forbids the citizen
to labor, and pursue his worldly business, on any day of the week
except on the Lord's day, usually called Sunday. In the case of
Farnum vs. Fowle, 12 Mass. Rep. 94, it is said by Chief Justice
Parker: "There are no fixed and established holidays ii Massachusetts, in which all business is suspended," except Sunday.
2. The observance of Sunday as a Sabbath, or a-day bf ceremonial rest, was first enjoined by the Emperor Constantine as a civil
regulation, in conformity with the practice of the Christian church.
Hence it is a maxim of the civil law, "Die bus dominicis mercarf,
judicari vel jurari.non debet." This day, with others soon after
added by ecclesiastical authority, (such as "Dies Natalis," or
Christmas, and "Pach a," or Easter,) were called "IDies Feti,"
or "Feri'," which we call festivals, saints' days, holy days, or
holidays. In the thirteenth century, the number of these festivals
enjoined by the church was so increased that they exceeded the
number-of Sundays in the year. The multiplication of them by the
church had its origin in a spirit of kindness and Christian philan-
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thropy. Their policy was to alleviate the hardships and misery of
predial slaves and the poor laborers on the soil, who were compelled
to labor for their feudal lords. But afterwards, when these vassals
were enfranchised, and tilled the earth for themselves, they complained that "they were ruined" by the number of church festivals
or compulsory holidays. In 1695, the French king forbid the
establishment of any new holidays unless by royal authority; and
the church went further, and suppressed a large number of them, or
transferred their observance to the next Sunday. (See Dalloz,
vol. 29, tit. "Jour .Ferie," and 2d Campeaux Droit Civil, p. 168.)
The same observance of these festivals was required by the ecclesiastical authorities as that which was due to Sunday. Men were
forbidden to labor, or to follow their usual business or employments. But to this rule there were many exceptions of persons
and trades who were not subjected to such observance.
Without enumerating all the exceptions, we may mention that,
by the canon law, the observance of these days did not extend "to
those who sold provisions; to posts or public conveyances; to travellers; to carriers by land or water; to tiLe lading and unlading
of ships engaged in maritime commerce."
Thus we see that in those countries where these holidays had
their origin, and the sanction both of church and state, they were
not allowed to interfere with the necessities of commerce, or to extend to ships, or those who navigate them. And it would certainly
present a strange anomaly if this country, in the nineteenth century,
should be found re-establishing the superstitious observances of the
dark ages with increased rigor, which both priest and sovereign in
the seventeenth have been compelled to abolish as nuisances.
In England and other Protestant countries, while a more strict
observance of the Lord's day is enforced by statute, the other fasts
and festivals enjoined by the church have never been treated as
coming within the category of compulsory holidays. Every man is
left free to follow the dictates of his conscience in regard to them.
Formerly their courts sat even on Sunday; nor were contracts
made on that day considered illegal or void till the statute of 29
Charles II., c. 27, was enacted, whereby "no person whatever is
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allowed to do or exercise any worldly labor or work of their callings
on the Lord's day." But this prohibition was never extended,
either by statute or usage, to other church fasts, festivals, or holidays. It is true that there are three days in the year-to wit,
Candlemas, Ascension, and St. John the Baptist-in which the
courts do not sit, and the officers are allowed a holiday. But there
is no trace of any decision by their courts that worldly labor was
prohibited on those days, or any usage that ships should not be
unladen and. freight delivered and received on such days. These
saints' days and church fasts or festivals, are treated as voluntary
holidays, not as Sabbaths of compulsory rest.
In the case of Figgins vs. Willie, 2 Blackstone, 1186, where a
public officer claimed a right of holiday on the feast day of St. Barnabas, Chief Justice De Grey says: "I by no means approve of
these self-made. holidays. The offices ought to be open." And in
Sparrow vs. Cooper, 2 Black. 1315, the same judge observes, in
reference to the same day: 1 There is no prescriptive right to keep
this as a holiday. It is not established by any act of Parliainent.
The boards of revenue, custom-house and excise may act as they
please, and pay such compliment to their officers and servants as
they shall judge expedient, by remitting morl frequently the hard
labor of their clerks; but they are no examples for the court." And
the Justices Gould and Blackstone severally observe: "My objection extends to all holidays, as well as St. Barnabas Day."
It may be observed, in passing, that there, as well as here, the
class of persons most anxious to multiply holidays 'were the public
officers, apprentices, clerks, and others receiving yearly salaries.
. It is matter of history that the State of Massachusetts was
colonized by men who fled from ecclesiastical oppression, that they might
enjoy liberty of conscience; and that while they enforced the most
rigid observance of the Lord's day as a Sabbath, or day of ceremonial rest, tihey repudiated with abhorrence all saints' days and festivals observed by the churches of Rome or England. They " did
not desire to be again brought in bondage, to observe days and
months, and times and years." And while they piously named a
day in every year, which they recommended that Christians should
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spend in fasting and prayer, they imposed it on no man's conscience
to abstain from his worldly occupations on such day, much less did
they anticipate that it would be perverted into an idle holiday.
The proclamation of the Governor is but a recommendation; it has
not the force of law, nor was it so intended. The duties of fasting
and prayer are voluntary, and not of compulsion, and holiday is a
privilege, not a duty. In almost every State in the Union a day
of thanksgiving is appointed in the fall of the year, by the Governor,
because there is no ecclesiastical authority which would be acknowledged by the various denominations. It is an excellent custom,
but it binds no man's conscience, or requires him to abstain from
labor. Nor is it necessary to a literal compliance with the recommended fast day, that all labor should cease, and the day be observed
as a Sabbath, or as a holiday. It is not so treated by those who
conscientiously observe every Friday as a fast day.
IIL Does the testimony in this case show that, from time immemorial, there has been a well known usage, having the force and
effect of law in Boston, which requires all men to cease from labor,
and compels vessels engaged in foreign. commerce to cease from
discharging their cargoes, and hinders consignees from receiving
them ?
We do not know this fact judicially, for (except in this case)
there is no judicial decision, or course of decisions, in Massachusetts, which establishes the doctrine that carriers must cease to discharge cargo on this day in the port of Boston, but rather the contrary. And after a careful examination of the testimony, we are
compelled to say that we find no sufficient evidence of such a peculiar custom in Boston, differing from that of all other commercial
cities in the world.
The testimony shows this, and no more: that some persons go to
church on that day; some close the windows of their warehouses and
shops, and either abstain from work or do it privately; some work
half the day, and some not at all. Public officers, school-boys,
apprentices, clerks, and others who live on salaries, or prefer pleasure to business, claim the privilege of holiday, while those who
depend on their daily labor for their daily bread, and cannot afford
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to be idle, pursue their occupations as usual. The libellants appear
to have had no conscientious scruples on the subject, as they received
goods from other ships, and some from this. But the testimony is
clear, that however great the number may be who choose to convert
the day into a voluntary holiday for idleness or amusement, it never
has been the custom that vessels discharging cargo on the wharves
of Boston, ceased on that day; that like the canon law regarding
church festivals and holidays of other countries and former ages,
the custom of Boston, (if it amount to anything more than that
every man might do as he pleased on that day) did not extend to
vessels engaged in foreign commerce, or forbid the carrier to continue the delivery of freight on that day.
On the whole, we are of opinion that the bark Tangier has made
good delivery of her cargo to the consignees according to the exigency of her bill of lading, and that the decree of the Circuit Court
should be reversed, and the libel dismissed with costs.

Za the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
COMMONWEALTH EX REL. R. G. HAMILTON vs. THE SELECT AND COMMON
COUNCILS OF THE CITY OF PITTSBURG, COMPOSED OF D. FITZSIMMONS,
ET AL.
1. Mandamus is the proper and appropriate writ to compel a municipal corporation
to make provision for the payment of interest due upon bonds issued by the same
in payment of its subscription to the stock of a railroad company, by the assessment and collection of the necessary taxes.
2. Mandamus is the proper remedy where there is a clear legal right in the relAtors, a corresponding duty in the defendant, and a want of any other adequate
and specific remedy.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-The alternative mandamus in this case, following
the suggestion of the relator, avers that he is the owner of two certificates of loan or bonds of the city of Pittsburg, each for the sum
of one thousand dollars, the ownership of which he acquired by
purchase; that these certificates of loan or bonds, with others,
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amounting in all to the sum of $150,000, were issued by the said
city in payment of a subscription for three thousand shares of the
capital stock of the Chartiers Valley Railroad Company; that all
the bonds are signed by the Mayor of the city, countersigned by
the Treasurer, and sealed with the city's corporate sea.1 ; and that
they pledge the faith, credit and property of the said city of Pittsburg for the payment of the principal and interest thereof. It is
further averred that, by an act of Assembly, approved February 7,
1858, the organization of the Chartiers Valley Railroad Company
was authorized, and the city of Pittsburg was empowered, to
subscribe to the capital stock of said company, not exceeding the number of five thousand shares; to borrow money for
the pjayment of such subscription, and to make provision for the
payment of the principal and interest of the money so borrowed, by
the assessment and collection of such tax as may be necessary for
that purpose, as in other cases of loans to corporations. It is further averred, that the act of Assembly provided that the subscription to the stock should be directed by resolution passed by the
corporate constituted authorities of said city, and that accordingly
the Councils thereof, by ordinance passed the 27th day of June,
1853, authorized and directed the Mayor to subscribe, in behalf of
the city, three .thousand shares of the capital stock of said company,
and to make and execute bonds for the payment -of such subscriptions. Still further, it is averred that the bonds were duly transferred in accordance with the act of Assembly, and that a large
amount of interest is now, and has been for a long time past, due and
payable upon them, but that the city of Pittsburg has wholly neglected and refused to pay said interest so due, or to make any provision whatever for the payment thereof, and that, under the acts
of Assembly, it is the duty of the Select and Common Councils of
the said city, in each and every year, to provide for the payment of
said interest by the assessment and collection of such taxes as may
be necessary for the purpose, but that they have -wholly and wrongfully neglected to make any provision whatever for the payment,
notwithstanding the holders of the bonds or certificates of loan have
demanded and endeavored to procure payment.
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We shall spend no time in endeavoring. to prove what is apparent
upon the face of this statement of facts, that it presents a fit case
for a mandamus. Here is a clear legal right in the relator, a corresponding duty in the defendants, and a want of any other adequate and specific remedy. No action at law would lie at the suit
of the relator against the defendants for not making provision for
the payment of the interest, for not levying and collecting a tax,
which is the thing sought to be accomplished by this writ. That an
action might be brought against the city upon the bonds themselves,
is true, but that is not the right here asserted, nor would it enforce
the duty alleged. The liability of the city to pay the bonds is one
thing, the duty of the Councils to make provisions for their payment
is quite another. The City Councils are public bodies, and the.
members of the Councils are public officers. Nothing is better settled than that mandamus is the appropriate writ by which the Commonwealth compels the performance of a public duty. The propriety of this form of remedy for such a case as this relator presents,
was fully vindicated in Commonwealth ex rel. Ihomas vs. The Oommissioners of Allegheny Co., 8 Casey, 218, and both English and
American authorities were referred to in support of its use. Cases
are numerous in which the writ has been sustained to enforce the
levy and collection of a tax. Queen vs. The Wardens of the
Parishof St. Saviour, 7 Ad. & El. 925 ; Queen vs. The Select Vestrymen of St. Margaret,8 Ad..& El. 889; Queen vs. Thomas,3 Com.
Bench, 589. Tapping, in his Treatise on Mandamus, says, page
67: "The writ has often been granted to command church-wardens
to make and raise one or more rates for the re-payment of principal
money, with interest, borrowed on the credit of the parish and church
rates." So it has been granted to command justices to tax, rate
and assess a'parish for the support of the poor. In the case of Te
Justies of Clark vs. The Pari, &c., Turnpike Road Co., 11 B
Monroe, 143, it was decided that mandamus was the appropriate
and only remedy for compelling compliance with a duty to levy
money to pay a subscription to the stock of a turnpike road company. In Maddox vs. Graham & Knox, 7 American Law
Register 744, it was applied by the Court of Appeals of Ken-
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tucky to a case in all essential particulars like the present. Many
other similar decisions might be quoted. If, then, the relator is the
owner of some of the bonds upon which interest is due and payable,
and if it be the duty of the defendants to make provision for the
payment of the interest by levying and collecting a tax, a duty
which they have neglected and refused to perform, it is no novelty
that they are called upon by the writ of mandamus to discharge
that duty. The novelty is in the necessity for the writ, and not in
the writ itself.
Before entering upon an examination of the return made by the
defendants to the alternativ6 writ, it seems proper to dispose of the
objections urged against the writ itself. They are eleven in number, and all of them are merely formal. The first is that it does
not aver or set out any law conferring authority upon the city of
Pittsburg to make provision for the payment of bonds, or interest
accruing thereon, by assessing and collecting taxes, but avers that
a subscription was made, and that bonds were issued in payment of
said subscription, without showing any authority of law for the issue
of bonds for that purpose. The writ does, however, aver authority
in the city of Pittsburg, conferred by an act of Assemblr, to subscribe to the capital stock, to borrow money to pay for the subscription, and to make provision for the payment of the principal and
interest of the sum so borrowed, by the assessment and collection of
a tax. A power to borrow money, surely, it need not be argued,
includes the power to give bonds or other usual securities to the
lender. We cannot be expected to decide that the bonds are illegal, because the abt of Assembly did not specify what securities
might be given for the money borrowed, or that a power to-brrow
money to pay a debt, including, as it does, the power to issue bonds,
is not executed by giving bonds to the creditor. In substance, the
money is borrowed from the purchasers of the bonds; it is advanced
on the faith of the city's obligations, for the very purpose for which
the city was aitthorized to raise it. Apart from the fact; that the
act of Assembly referred to in the writ authorized the bands issued
for the purpose of borrowing the money, to be given and: received
in payment of the subscription, it is to be observed that they wsre19
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in fact made payable to bearer, that they might readily pass from
hand to hand. The Chartiers Valley Railroad Company may therefore well be considered the agent of the obligors, to raise money
upon their obligations. It has never before been doubted, that he
is a borrower who executes his bonds payable to bearer, and then,
by his agent, sells them in the market.
It is next objected, that the writ does not set out when the principal of the bonds is payable, what rate of interest they bear, or the
time and place at which it is payable. No attempt has been made
to inform us why such allegations are needful. The date of the
bonds, the fact that they do bear interest, (which, of course, is legal
interest, when no other rate is mentioned,) the fact that interest is
in arrear, the fact that the relator is the owner of some of the bonds,
and the fact that the defendants have made no provision for payment, but have. wholly neglected and refused to make provision,
although it is their duty, by law, to make it, are averred, and if
these averments of fact be true, the right to a peremptory mandamus is complete. The respondents are not now asked to make provision for the payment of the principal, nor are they, by this proceeding, required to pay even the interest. The demand of the
writ is only that they provide for the payment of the interest. To
a compliance with this demand, it is of no consequence thaC the writ
should state when the principal will become payable, or when or
where the interest is to be paid.
The next objection is that the writ does not set out the relator's
title to the bonds, but simply avers that he became the purchaser,
without stating how they were transferred, or the consideration paid
by him. The averment of ownership of the bonds of the relator is
only necessary to show his right to ask the interference of the court
by mandamus. If he has a legal right, no matter how he acquired
it, it is all that the law demands. The amount of the consideration
paid by him on his purchases, or the mode in which the bonds were
transferred to him, are quite immaterial to the question whether he
has a legal right. But the writ does aver that the bonds were purchased by the relator, and that he holds them in his own right, and
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it also asserts that they were duly transferred in accordance with
the act of Assembly.
The fourth exception is, that the relator alleges that coupons for
the interest were attached to the bonds, but does not aver that he
is either the purchaser or holder of any of the coupons, while the
copy of the bond attached to his affidavit shows that the interest is
only payable on the presentation of the coupons. If the exception
means any thing, it is that the relator's legal right is not sufficiently
averred. It is, however, set out that he is the purchaser and holder
of bonds bearing interest, and that all the bonds have coupons attached. The ownership of the bonds necessarily includes the ownership of the right to the interest secured by them, and of the coupons attached, which are themselves part of the securities. The
writ does, therefore, aver sufficiently the relator's title to the inteterest, which the defendants neglect and refuse to provide for.
It is next urged that the writ is insufficient, because it contains
no averment that any demand was ever made upon the Councils to
make provision for the payment of the interest alleged to be due,
by the assessment and collection of taxes for that purpose. It is,
undoubtedly, the general rule that the writ should contain an averment of a demand and refusal. The reason assigned is, that it
should appear that the defendants have had the option of doing or
refusing to do that which is required of them before the applicati6n
be made to the court for compulsory process. This is a right of the
defendants; but, like all other rights, it may be waived. The law
never requires a vain thing. Thus, in cases where a tender is necessary, if the party to whom it is due declares that he will not accept
it, none need be made. A readiness to make it in such a case, is
all that is required. Here the writ avers, not alone that the defendants have neglected, but that they have refused to 'make any
provision for the payment of the interest. The allegation is that
they have had their option, (all which a demand is intended to
give,) and that they have chosen to refuse. That a precise demand
is not necessary in all cases, is shown in Regina vs. Tin dall, 1 Ad.
& El., N. S. 886; and, in regard to a refusal, any thing which shows
that the defendant does not intend to perform the duty, is sufficient
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to warrant the issue of a mandamus; 4 B. & Ad. 580; 10 A. & F
561 ; 8 A. & E. 889, 901 ; Maddox vs. Graham, supra.
The sixth exception taken to the writ is, that it contains no reference to any act or law which makes it the duty of the Select and
Common Councils of the city of Pittsburg, or the defendants, to
assess taxes for any purpose. Even if it were necessary to refer to
and recite the particular act of Assembly, which imposes upon the
defendants the duty, the performance of which the writ commands,
it is a sufficient answer to this exception that it is not founded in
fact.
The writ avers that, by virtue of the act of February 7, 1853,
and also the act of Assembly conferring upon the Select and Common Councils of the city of Pittsburg, power to assess bnd collect
taxes for the use of the said city, it became their duty to provide
for the payment of the interest upon the bonds, by the assessment
and collection of such taxes as may be necessary for the purpose.
It is absurd to argue that conferring such a power is imposing no
duty. The Select and Common Councils are public agents, created
to perform a public trust. One of the purposes of their creation
is that they may provide for the payment of the debts of the city.
It is true that the act of February 7, 1858, only declares that
the city "shall have power" to make provision for the payment
of the principal and interest of the money borrowed, by the
assessment and collection of a tax, but, in a statute, the word
may means must or shall, in cases where the public interest and
rights are conceined, and where the public or third persons have
a claim de jure, that the power should be exercised. Thus, in
Rex vs. Barlow, 2 Salk. 609, church-wardens were indicted for
not making a rate or assessment under the statute of 14 Charles
II., for the reimbursement of some constables. The words of
the statute were, they "shall have power and authority to make a
rate," but, the statute was construed to be peremptory, imposing a
duty, because the constables had an interest in the exercise of the
.power. In Xing vs. The Inhabitants of Derby, Skinner 370, it
was said that may, in the case of a public, is tantamount to shall.
In Newburgh Turnpike Co. vs. Miller, 5 Johns. Cha. 118, it was
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said that, whenever an act to be done under a statute is to be
done by a public officer, and concerns the public interest, or the
rights of third persons, which require the performance of the act,
it then becomes the duty of the officer to do it; Malcom vs. Rogers,
5 Cowen, 188, is to the same effect. The duty of the city is, therefore, imperative, to assess and collect taxes, and the power and corresponding duty are, by one of the acts referred to, devolved upon
the Select and Common Councils.
It is a sufficient answer to the seventh objection to the writ, that
the act of February 7, 1853, directs that provision be made for the
payment of the principal and interest of the debt incurred by the
subscription, by the assessment and collection of a tax. The case is
very unlike King vs. Margate Pier Co., 3 B. & A. 220. That was
a mandamus to a corporation, commanding them to pay a poor rate.
The ordinary remedy was a distress, and the writ omitted to state
that the defendants had no effects upon which a distress could be
levied. But here the writ avers, that by reason of the neglect and
refusal of the defendants to perform their legal duty, i. e., that of
making provision, the relator has been unable to recover the amount
of interest now, and for a long time past, due and unpaid.
The eighth exception is, that the writ does not sufficiently aver
the want of other legal remedy. It does, however, distinctly assert
that the relator cannot have adequate relief without the aid of 3
writ of mandamus, and no more need be averred. It is all which
was alleged in the case of Uommmonwealth ex rel. Thomas vs. The
Commissioners, and the averment was then held sufficient.
The ninth exception is, that the mandate is to provide for interest not yet due, and which may never become due, and therefore
anticipates a future violation of duty. The mandamus is to make
provision for the payment of all the interest due when the writ issued, and all that should become due during the year 1859. Providing
for the interest due, and all that would become due while the defendants are in office, is in reality one duty, and a refusal to take
the first step, is a refusal to perform any part of the duty.
The tenth objection is, that several parties, claiming under differ-
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ent rights, are joined in the same writ. This a mistake of the fact,
and therefore needs no further notice.
The eleventh and last exception is, that the writ does not mention the amount of interest due, or for which provision is to be
made. It is, however, in this respect, sufficiently certain. It describes the bonds, their date and amount ; they are bonds of the

city of Pittsburg. From the necessity of the case, the amount of
unpaid interest must be known to the obligors. The extent of their
duty is, therefore, defined. In this particular, the writ is like that
in Thomas's Case, which was ruled to be sufficient.
This is all which need be said respecting the objections urged
against the writ itself. They are all thoroughly technical, and
many of them have been heretofore held by this court to bp unavailing; 8 Casey, 218.
We pass now to the return made to the alternative writ. Several
matters are alleged as reasons why the duty which the writ seeks to
enforce has not been performed, and why a peremptory mandamus
should not issue. The first is an objection to the jurisdiction of this
court. That jurisdiction, is, by the Constitution, declared to be coextensive with the State. The power to issue writs of miandamus
has always been exercised by the court, and recognized as an existing power again and again by the legislature. We do not understand this. to be denied; but it is contended that the court, while
sitting in the eastern district, is not authorized to send.its writ to
the defendants, who are resident in the western district. The.
State, it is true, has been divided into four districts ; but for what
purpose ? It was not to limit the jurisdiction of the court, or to
restrict the range of its writ. The districts were created, as the
act of Assembly declares, solely for the purpose of holding the
Supreme Court, and the judges are required to hold terms in each
district. If this be the object of division into districts, it can have
no effect upon the range of the court's writs. Were there no such
division, it would hardly be claimed that the writ might not go to
any part of the State, from the place where the court might be in
session. Accordingly, it has been ruled, that the Supreme Court,
at its session in either of its districts, may issue writs of mandamus
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to any part of the State; 9 Har. 9. And, indeed, it must be so ;
for if these writs, and writs of quo warranto, did not run beyond
the limits of the district in which the court is in session, there
.would be, in many cases, a failure of justice. The ruling in
9 Harris, 9, was followed in Thomas's Case, and is no longer open
to question. Nor certainly can there be any reason to complain,
when the defendant is heard within the district in which he resides.
The next averment of the return is, that there is no such corporation or body politic known to the law as the city of Pittsburg, of
whose Councils, Select or Common, the persons named in the writ
are supposed to be members, but that the corporate name is "The
Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of Pittsburg." The writ is directed to the Select and Common Councils of the City of Pittsburg, composed of D. Fitzsimmons and others, defendants. It is
not directed to the city, but to the individuals who constitute the
Select and Common Councils. The question is not, therefore,
whether, if an action had been brought at law against the City of
Pittsburg, the misnomer might have been pleaded in abatement, for
it'is not the corporation which is sued. But even if it were, the
mistake is amendable. Formerly, when the doctrine of amendments
remained as at common law, the court would not allow a writ of
mandamus to be amended after return filed; but, as is said by Tapping, page 334, the strict rule of the common law has been of late
years altogether departed from; the principle as to amendment
which.now obtains being that it shall be allowed in all cases, when
such a course will promote justice. Thus, in a late case, the court
ordered the writ to be amended during an argument, in order that
such argument might proceed independently of such objection.
Iex vs. .ewbury, 1 Q. B. 759. It needs no argument to prove that
justice would not be promoted by turning the relator out of court
because he has described the defendants as members of the Select
and Common Councils of Pittsburg, instead of members of the Select and Common Councils of "The Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of Pitsburg." Even the very act which incorporated the city
more than once denominates it the city of Pittsburg. One of our
statutes of amendments authorizes an amendment of the record of
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any action in any stage of the proceedings when it shall appear by
any sufficient evidence that a mistake has been made in the Christian name or surname of any party, plaintiff or defendant.. As
statutes of jeofails are construed liberally, it would seem to- be
within the spirit of this act to allow an amendment of a corporate
name, when a. corporation is a party. But, whether it would or
pot, need not now be decided, for the mandamus is not to the artificial being known either as the city of Pittsburg or as " The Mayor,
Aldermen, and Citizens of Pittsburg." It is not, therefore, misdirected.
The third averment of the return is somewhat similar to the
second. It is in substance, that by none of the acts of Assembly
mentioned is the corporation known by the name and style of "The
Mayor, Aldermen, and Citizens of Pittsburg," authorized to subscribe for stock of the said railroad company, or to issue bonds
therefor, or to make provision for the payment of the principal and
interest thereof. It is not denied that such'authority was conferred
upon the city of Pittsburg; nor indeed could it be, for it is, in direct
terms by the act of February 7, 1853. What is this, then, but an
evasive averment ? In construing the statute, we are to give effect
to the legislative intention, and, in speaking of the corporation, it
is generally denominated the city of Pittsburg. This is its common name in the numerous statutes which have been passed conferring upon it privileges, and it has never before been doubted
what the legislature intended. Thus, among many instances,.when,
after a great fire, a 'State -appropriation was made for ihe relief of
the sufferers, it was made only for the sufferers by the fire in the
city of Pittsburg, and was directed to be paid to the Mayor and
Select and Common Councils of the said city. Who questioned
then that this was a benefit conferred upon the Mayor and Aldermen and citizens of Pittsburg? We should justly be regarded as
trifling with statutory enactments were we to hold that the act of
1853 did not confer upon the municipal corporation the power to
subscribe for stock, to issue bonds, and to make provision for the
payment of the principal and interest thereof.
Next is it pleaded that the Select and Common Councils, of
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which the defendants are members, are by law deliberative and
legislative bodies only, possessed of an entire discretion in the exercise of all the power committed to their hands, subject to no control whatever beyond their own sense and convictions of duty, so
long as they are acting within the legitimate sphere of the powers
conferred upon them. This is, at most, a denial of the legal duty
which the writ charges to be resting upon them, coupled with a negation of the right of this court to control their discretion. It may
be admitted that, if respondents have an option to do one thing or
another, courts will not award a mandamus to compel one thing to
be done. They cannot be compelled to exercise their discretion in
a particular way. Yet even a judicial officer, as has often been decided, may be commanded to proceed to judgment-an arbitrator
to make an award-though what the judgment or award may be,
the court will not direct. Tapping, 109. But this is not a case in
which the defendants have any discretion. This averment, in their
return, mistakes their legal duty. It is not an: obligation to consider, to use a discretion, but it is an obligation to act. The sixth
section of the act of February 7, 1853, gave them power to make
provision for the payment of the principal and interest by the assessment and collection of such tax as may be necessary for that
purpose. As they are public officers, and as the relator is interested in their thus making provision, the possession of the power
brings with it the duty to exercise. it, their discretion is taken away.
This has already been shown by our remarks upon one of the objections taken to the form of the writ, and the authorities need not
again be cited.
Next, the return avers that the Select and Common Councils are
not integral parts of the corporation, but only several and co-ordinate branches of the legislature thereof, acting separately and independently of each other, that the concurrence of both bodies is
essential to the validity of all legislative acts affecting the corporation, and that the defendants are without power of themselves to
assess or impose taxes, or to compel the concurrence of the other
branch of said Councils in any act. We do not perceive that this
is any answer to the mandate of the writ, and no attempt has been
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made to show us how the fact averred is material. The defendants
are all the members of both branches, and, if each discharges his
duty, there can be no want of concurrence of Councils.
The sixth averment of the return reciting the act of 1853,
and the ordinance authorizing the subscriptions, and after admitting that the subscription was made as averred in the writ,
and that bonds were given to the company for the amount,
proceeds to charge .that the act of Assembly provided that the
bonds should be transferable in such manner as should be directed
by the city, and that they might be received by the company in
such manner as might be agreed upon between the parties. The
defendants then aver that no money was borrowed to pay for the
stock; but that the bonds were made payable, and actually delivered, to the company itself, and that no direction was given by the corporation as to the manner in which the bonds should be transferable.
How does all this negative thi liability of the defendants to make
Conceding the facts
provision for the payment of the interest
alleged, as the demurrer does, it is only by drawing an erroneous
inference of law from those facts that they became of any importance. We have already shown that giving the bonds to the company in payment, was a mode of borrowing authorized by the act.
But the payment to the company, by the bonds, was expressly authorized. It would be a most illiberal construction, even if it were
not so, to hold that the power to assess a tax was conferred only in
case the money should be borrowed from third persons'and paid to
the company.
The other assertion of fact, that the city did not direct how the
bonds should be transferred, if it means any thing, is a blow at the
title of the relator; but it is not denied in any part of the return
that they were made payable to bearer, and therefore that they
passed by delivery, or that they were thus made by the agents of
the city.. This obviously amounts in effect, though not in words, to
a direction of the mode in which they should be transferred. When,
therefore, it is averred that there was no direction, it can only be
intended that there was none by express ordinance. The averment
is, therefore, wholly immaterial. It would be allowing a gross
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fraud, if, after the city has executed its bonds, affixed to them its
corporate seal, made them payable to bearer, and sent them out to
find purchasers, it might be permitted to say, to one who has advanced his money on the faith of them, that it had not directed
how they should be transferred.
The next allegations of the return are, that the city ordinance,
which directed the subscription, provided that the directors of the
company should agree with the city in writing to pay the current
interest accruing on the bonds; that the subscription should not
be made uptil subscriptions to the amount of $350,000 had been
first obtained from responsible sources other than contractors;
that the money realized from the sale of the bonds should be expended in the construction of the road nearest Pittsburg; that no
bonds should be issued or signed by the Mayor until the survey and
location of the road should be first made and agreed upon bythe board
of directors; and, also, that the Councils should appoint three of their
number as a committee under whose control the bonds should be
sold, of all which the relator and other holders of the bonds had
legal notice, as the defendants believe. The- return then proceeds
to aver that these conditions were not complied with, and that the
company has not paid the current interest, but that it is insolvent.
If the facts thus pleaded can avail the defendants at all, it must
,be because they show that the city is not liable upon the bonds. If,
therefore, these facts be all admitted, and yet the liability of the
city to pay the debt, exist, they constitute no sufficient answer to
the writ. Now, it is to be observed that, by the provisions of the
ordinance itself, the Mayor was designated as the agent of the corporation to make the subscription' to execute and issue the bonds,
and to enter into the agreement with the c6mp~ny that it should
pay the current interest. He- was the agent of the city alone.
True, he was required not to subscribe, or sign bonds, or issue them,
until certain preliminary things, intended for the benefit of the city,
had first been done; but, from the nature of his agency, he was to
determine whether they had been done. When, therefore, the bonds
were issued and came into the hands of a purchaser, he had a right
to presume that every thing preliminary to their lawful issue had
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been done; for, if it had not, the obligors were in fault. The bonds
themselves, though referring to the ordinance, gave the purchaser
no notice of any default in the city's agent. The return charges,
indeed, that the relator and other bondholders had notice of the
ordinance and its requirements ; but it does not aver that they had
any notice of the alleged facts that those requirements, which were
prerequisites to the issue and sale of the bonds, had not been complied with. Those facts are entirely outside of the ordinance itself.
Still more, the bonds were created for the purpose of sale. They
were intended as a means of raising money for the construction of
the railroad. It was with this design that the municipal subscription, payable in bonds, was authorized by the legislature. If it had
been required that the company should retain the bonds, they would
have been useless in the prosecution of their work, and the purpose
of the subscription would have been defeated. It was so understood by the city; for the ordinance speaks' of their sale, and requires that the moneys realized from the sale should be expended
in the construction of the part of the road nearest to Pittsburg.
Accordingly, they were issued in the best form for sale and easy
transfer. They were made payable to bearer, and consequently
passed by delivery.
Again, the ordinance directed that the bonds should be issued
bearing interest, payable half yearly; in other words, that, by
them, the city should assume' the obligation to pay not only the
principal, but the interest, and so the bonds were, in fact, put upon
the market.
Now, under these circumstances, it can with no reason be contended that the purchaser of the bonds stands in no better situation
than the Chartiers Valley Railroad Company, which received them
in payment of the subscription. We have not, it is true, decided
that such securities are negotiable in the sense in which bills of
exchange 4nd promissory notes are held to be, and in this particular
we have not gone so far as the tribunals of our sister States and of
England have gone. We carefully avoided so deciding in the case
of The Commonwealth vs. Zhe dommissioners of Allegkeny County, and thus left open a door through which that county might, if
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she would, secure all the equities which she has. But it has been
ruled in this State, that the legal title to a bond of a corporation,
payable to bearer, passes by delivery, and that the holder may sue
in his own name. Carr vs. Lefevre, 3 Casey, 413. In other
words, the obligor is regarded as having bound himself directly to
the holder. In the ordinary case of an assignment of a bond, the
assignee doubtless takes the security, subject to a right in the obligor to defalcate against the assignee, or show want of consideration
or non-existence of the debt. We speak now of assignments which
pass the legal title. But as was said by Gibson, J., in Davie8 vs.
Barr, 9 S. & R. 141, "With any agreement between the original
parties, inconsistent with the purport or legal effect of the instrument, the assignee has nothing to do. The assignee is not botind
to call upon the obligor for information about matters, the existence
of which he has no reason to suspect; the necessity of inquiry being
limited, as I have said, to want of consideration and set-off." This
statement is not, indeed, precisely accurate. The obligor may set
up against an assignee of the obligee, not.only set-off and want of
consideration, but he may disprove the existence of the debt. Yet
he cannot assert a secret equity, or in agreement merely collateral,
and even in the case of an ordinary bond, if*it be placed in the
hands of an obligee for the purpose of enabling him to raise money
upon it, the purchaser is affected by no want of consideration or
defence of the obliger against the obligee. Any other rule would
be enabling the obligor to perpetrate a fraud, and, indeed, to make
use of that fraud to his own advantage. It has often been ruled
that if an obligor encourage a transfer of a common bond, he cannot afterwards deny that he owes it, and this, though the transferree
hold it only by equitable assignment. The principle of such a ruling
applies with double force to bonds made payable to bearer, when
the legal title passes by delivery, and which have been issued for
the purpose of sale. The purchaser of such a bond has a right to
presume that every prerequisite necessary to give force to the instrument has been complied with, especially where it is a prerequisite
only for the benefit of the obligor.
That portion of the averment which alleges that one of the con-

COMMONWEALTH vs. THE CITY OF PITTSBURG.

ditions upon which the bonds were directed by the ordinance to be
issued, was that the company should agree to pay the current interest, and that they were delivered on that condition, comes far shbrt
of a denial that the city is liable to pay interest to a purchaser and
holder. The agreement of the company to pay current interest was
to be an agreement with the city, not with the bondholder. It was
for the benefit of the city exclusively that it was demanded, and it
could by no possibility affect the right of the holder of the bond.
The bonds, as has been seen, were authorized by the ordinance, to
bind the city to pay interest, and they were in truth so issued.
That it was intended that the holder was to get interest is not
ddnied, but how could he get it except from the city? The agreement of the company was no contract with him, and the transfer of
the bond to him could not amount to an assignment of any security
for the payment of interest which the obligor held. It .would not
pass even if it had been an engagement of a 'third person to the
company to pay the interest. Beckley vs. _ckert, 3"Barr, 292.
Much less when it is a promise to the debtor. In Davies vs. Barr;
it was held that with an agreement of the original parties to restrain
the use of a bond, an assignee of it had nothing to do. -It would
be extraordinary, if, in a suit upon a bond against a principal and
surety, even -the latter could set up as a defence that the principal
had agreed to pay the interest, and that therefore he was not liable ;
but it would be still more extraordinary if the principal debtor
could defend himself under such a promise of the surety. Yeti in
this case, the company is not so much as surr-ty,. so far as relates to
the holders of the bonds. True, when the - ands were passed from
the company, a guaranty of the principal and interest was endorsed,
but if the bonds do not bind the city to pay interest, there is
nothing upon which the guaranty can operate. Nor could it make
any difference if the'holder had notice when he took the security
that the company had agreed to pay the interest, for the bond in
words gave him the obligation of the city to pay, and whether it be
as primary debtor or surety, it could not affect him. We have,
however, said enough upon these averments of the return to show
that they are wholly insufficient.
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Next comes an allegation, not of any fact, but of a supposed
principle of law. It is that the bonds, being under the seal of the
corporation, are open to every legal defence appearing on their
face, and subject to every equity to which they were liable in the
hands of the original holders; that all purchasers are affected with
notice of such defences, and that the corporation, when sued in a
court of law, may avail itself of all such defences, whether legal or
equitable. This has already been sufficiently considered, and shown
to be only partially correct in its application to this case,. not standing at all in the way of the relator's right or the city's liability.
The next averment is but a repetition of what was held in Commonwealth ex rel. Thomas vs. The Commissionersi &c., to be wholly
insufficient. It is most evasive. Taken as a whole, it is no denial
of what the writ assers-that the relator purchased and is possessed of the bonds.
The assertion that, as to any of the bonds other than those held
by the relatori the defendants are not bound to answer in this suit,
can hardly be called an averment of any fact. It seems intended,
however, as an objection to a supposed misjoinder of parties, and as
such, rests upon a plain misconception. The defendants are not
called upon to'answer several parties, but to respond to the commonwealth for an alleged neglect and refusal to perform official
duty. If that duty exist at all, it is to assess and collect taxes to
pay the interest upon all the bonds, and that duty is the same
whether one or all of the bondholders apply for the writ of mandamus. Tapping, 325. That obedience to the writ may have the
effect of perfecting the rights of many, is no objection to a writ presented by one relator.
. The twelfth and next averment is double. The defendants deny
that the bonds, or any of them, were transferred in accordance
with the acts of Assembly, or any of them. They also aver that
they are prohibited from laying on any more tax on the valuation
of taxable property than is already assessed and required for the
ordinary uses of the city.
The defendants do not deny that the bonds were transferred,
but only that the transfer was not in accordance with the Acts
of Assembly. It would be absurd to hold that such an aver-
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ment negatives any material part of the relator's case. If a
transfer, according to the acts of Assembly, was necessary, then
the return should aver the particular facts which distinguish the
transfer from such a one as the statute demands. Such a retirn as
this has been denominated shuffling, and held, therefore, to be utterly insufficient. See case cited in Tapping, 852, where the return
was that "a rate was not made according to act of Parliament."
A writ of mandamus is not to be answered by a frivolous, evasive,
or uncertain return. Nor can it be answered by any legal inferences' of the defendants from facts not stated. This court has a
right to know what the facts are, -that it may judge whether the
legal inferences are well drawn.
• The other averment may be considered in conn~ctiou with
the
sixteenth substantive allegation of the return, which is more defi.
nite and certain. It is declared that the act incorporating the town
of Pittsburg into a borough, prohibited the levy of any'tax in any
one year exceeding half a cent on a dollar on the valuation of-taxable property, unless some object of general utility should be thought
necessary, in which case a majority of the taxable inhabitants
should approve and certify the same in writing; that this act is
recognized and adopted in the act defining the powers of the Councils of the city, that the tax now, and for a long time past, required
and assessed for the ordinary uses of the city is at the rate of half
a cent on the dollar annually, of the valuation, and that a majority
of taxables have never, in writing, approved of the subscription or
of the levy of any additional tax therefor. The facts pleaded in these averments, so far as they are facts
and not legal conclusions, are admitted by the demurrer-; but it is
still an open question whether the law does impose upon the Councils such a restriction as to render the performance of the act enjoined by the writ illegal, and therefore impossible. Now, without
inquiring -how far the powers of the Councils were limited by the
act of Assembly incorporating the city of Pittsburg, it need only
be noticed, that the very act which authorized the subscription also
empowers, and, as we have seen, made it the duty of the city (acting, of course, through its Councils) to provide for the .payment of
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the principal and interest of the debt incurred by the subscription
by the assessment and collection of such a tax as may be necessary
for that purpose. If there was any restriction upon the rate of
taxation before, which we do not say, it was certainly removed by
the act of February 7, 1853, so far as relates to the levy of a tax
for the payment of the principal and interest of the debt incurred
by the subscription. When the legislature gave the power, it gave
with it every thing which was necessary for its exercise, and repealed every statutory prohibition of its enjoyment.
The remaining averments of the return may be disposed of in a
few words. That the liability of the city upon its bonds is disputed, and that no judgment has been recovered to warrant a mandamus execution, are wholly insufficient allegations. The defendants must obey the writ or show facts from which this court may
determine that the debt is not due by the city, or at least that it is
doubtful whether it be due. And this writ is not to be confounded
with a mandamus execution. Nor is the pending of a suit upon
other bonds than those of the relator at all material, in the absence
of any averment of facts which, if true, would amount to a. defence.
The same matter is not in controversy in that suit, which is contested here.
The seventeenth averment of the return, in which the defendants
allege that they cannot, conscientiously, consent to levy a tax, because they do not believe that the relator and other holders of the
bonds have any legal claim against the city, certainly has the merit
of novelty, as a defence. It will hardly be expected that we should
spend time upon that.
The denial of a demand for the interest has already been sufficiently discussed in our notice of the objections taken to the writs.
It is not denied that the defendants have refused, and still refuse1,
to make provision for the payment of the interest. That the com.
pany paid until its insolvency, cannot relieve them from liability to
provide for the payment of what is in arrears, if the city be liable
to pay.
The only other allegations of the return are general averments:
that the city is a municipal corporation; that the citizens and property
20
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holders never conferred upon the mayor or councils the power to
subscribe for stock in a railroad company; that the bonds were
issued under the authority of the legislature without the authority of
the inhabitants of the city, and that, therefore, the bonds are not in
the nature of a contract. These averments seem intended to negative
the policy and the constitutionality of the act of Assembly authorizing the subscription. We shall not discuss them. The impolicy
of municipal subscriptions to stock in railroad companies must be
admitted; -but the constitutionality of laws authorizing them has
been sustained, not only in this State, but in our sister States, by a
weight and uaiformity of judicial decisions, such as very few other
constitutional views have been able to bring to their support.
Upon a review of the whole case, therefore, we find ourselves
constrained to adjudge the return to the alternative mandamus insufficient. We might have shown that many of its allegations are
uncertain, argumentative, or evasive; but,. even if the facts alleged
be treated as well pleaded, they amount to no justification for a
neglect or refusal to make full and ample provision for the payment
of the interest upon the bonds (amounting to $150,000) by the assessment and collection of such- taxes as may be necessary for the
purpose.
Judgment must, therefore, be entered upon the demurrer against
the defendants, and a peremptory writ awarded.
And now, to wit: February 13, 1860, this cause having come on
for hearing at the -last term of the court at Pittsburg, was fully
arghed by counsel, whereupon the court, after due and mature consideration thereon had, for that it appears that the said return by
the said defendants made to the alternative writ is altogether insufficient, do order and adjudge that judgment be entered upon the
demurrer for the Commonwealth, and that the defendants and their
successors in office be and they are hereby commanded forthwith
to make full and ample provision for the payment of all the interest now due upon the bonds issued by the mayor, aldermen, and.
citizens of Pittsburg, in payment of their subscription of $150,000
to the capital stock of the Charters' Valley Railroad Company,
according to the tenor of said bonds, by the assessment and collection of such taxes as may be necessary for the purpose. And it is
further ordered that the defendants pay the costs of this suit.

NORTH YARMOUTH vs. SHILLINGS.

In the Supreme Court of Maine.'
INHABITANTS OF NORTH YARMOUTH VS. GREELEY SKILLINGS.
1. In respect to public corporations, which exist for public purposes alone, like
counties, cities and towns, the Legislature, under proper limitations, have the
right to restrain, modify, enlarge or change them, providing, however, that property owned by such corporations shall be secured for the use of those having an
interest in it.
2. If a town is divided, and a part of its territory, with the inhabitants thereof, is
incorporated into a new town, the old town will retain all the property, and be
responsible for the existing liabilities, unless there is some legislative provision
to the contrary.
3. But, upon such division, the Legislature have constitutional authority to provide
that the property, owned by the original town, shall be appropriated or held for
the use and enjoyment of the inhabitants of both towns, and to impose upon each
town the payment of a share of the corporate debts.
4. If, upon such division, the original town holds any property, such as flats, sedge
banks, or fisheries in trust, for the use of all the inhabitants, the Legislature may
provide that the original town shall still hold such property in trust for the in.
habitants of both towns.
5. In regard to property so held in trust, whether the Legislature, by dividing the
town, without making any such provision, could deprive a part of the inhabitants
of their accustomed use of it,-- qure.

In 1743, the proprietors of the lands in the town of North Yarmouth, conveyed to certain persons, then selectmen of said town,
"all the flats, sedge banks and muscle beds in said town, lying below high water mark."
This conveyance was made "in behalf, and for the sole use,
benefit and behoof of the present inhabitants of said town of North
Yarmouth, and of all such as may or shall forever hereafter inhabit
and dwell in the said town, to be by said inhabitants forever hereafter used, occupied and improved in common, with full liberty to
graze, feed, cut rock-weed, dig all sorts of shell fish," &c.
The rights conveyed by said deed continued to be enjoyed by the
inhabitants of North Yarmouth until 1849, when the Legislature
1 This case will be found in 45 Maine, p. 188, not yet published.
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divided said town, erecting a part of the territory into the town of
Yarmouth. By the legislative act of division and incorporation, it
was provided that the inhabitants of both towns should continue to
hold and enjoy in common, all their rights and privileges in said
flats, &c.
Subsequently, the town of North Yarmouth climed to hold said
flats, sedge banks, &c., for the exclusive use of the inhabitants of
that town, denying the right of the inhabitants of the new town of
Yarmouth 'to any enjoyment thereof. The defendant was originally
an inhabitant of North Yarmouth, and, after the division, an inhabitant of Yarmouth. Claiming the right thereby to enter upon
said flats, he went thereupon and cut a quantity of grass, for which
the plaintiffs brought this action of trespass quare clausum. At
the hearing, before Davis, J., the facts were reported by the agreement of the parties, and the case submitted to the full court.
Howard and Strout, argued for the plaintiffs.
By the facts agreed, the plaintiffs were sole owners of the premises
upon which the alleged trespass was committed, (by conveyance
from the proprietors of North Yarmouth in 1743,) up to .the time of
the incorporation of Yarmouth, Aug. 8, 1849.) Special Laws, 1849,
c. 264.
The title to the land owned by plaintiffs was not affected by the
act of incorporation referred to. Although it was competent for
the Legislature to establish a new corporation from a part of North
Yarmouth, and define its limits territorially, yet the Legislature
could not disturb the title to the land within the limits of either
corporation. They could properly change the municipal jurisdiction of the territory, but not its title. In respect to their titles to
lands, towns are as independent of the legislative control as are individuals. The Legislature could no more transfer the real estate
of one town to another, than they could convey the property of one
man to another, by legislative enactment.
When the inhabitants of Yarmouth were incorporated into a
separate town, they ceased to have any municipal rights or privileges in the town of North Yarmouth, and in its lands and public
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landings, &c. As individuals merely, they had no right, title or
interest in such lands and privileges. But it was only in their corporate relation that they possessed any such right and interest, and
when their municipal relation changed, their prior municipal rights
and relations ceased.
This was not a mere division of a town, but it was a creation
of a "separate town," investing it with all the privileges and
powers, and subjecting it to all the duties and liabilities incident to
the inhabitants of other towns in this State. The town of North
Yarmouth, remained with all of its corporate rights and privileges,
and, with its corporate obligations and duties unchanged, were
liable for all the debts and obligations of the town before the incorporation of Yarmouth.
Windham vs. Portland, 4 Mass. 889;
Richards vs. Doggett, 4 Mass. 539; Hfampshire vs. Franklin, 16
Mass. 86.
There is no evidence from which it can be inferred that the plaintiffs held the premises in trust. But if in trust, then only for the
inhabitants of the town of North Yarmouth, for the time being, with
their attendant corporate rights, duties and obligations, and not for
the inhabitants of any other town, who share none of the corporate
relations of the plaintiff town, since all such relations are local and
territorial in their origin, desigu and operation. Green vs. Putnam, 8 Cush. 21, 27.
The fifth section of the special law, 1849, c. 204, is unconstitutional and inoperative, and, consequently, Yarmouth had no title, or
right, or interest, in and to the premises; and the justification of
the defendant wholly fails.
The fourth section of the same statute has been pronounced
unconstitutional in some of its provisions, in a suit between the
towns of Yarmouth and North Yarmouth. Yarmouth vs. North
Yarmouth, 84 Maine, 411.

Shepley and Dana argued for defendant.
This case is to be distinguished from Yarmouth vs. North Yarmouth, 84 Maine, 411, because that was a case where the power of
the. Legislature to alter the rights of private corporations was
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called in question. In the case at bar an entirely different question
ispresented.
The town of North Yarmouth was a public corporation; and the
only question is, whether or not the Legislature, in erecting the
town of Yarmouth out of the limits of North Yarmouth, as before
constituted, had the right to make the provision it did in regard to
the common lands.
It has been settled in this country, ever since the case of Terrett
vs. -Taylor et al., 9 Cranch, 52, that the only restriction on the
legislative action in regard to public corporations is, that while they
may change, modify, enlarge or restrain these corporations, they
should secure the property of these corporations for the uses of
those for whom, and at whose expense, it was originally purchased.
See 2 Kent's Com., 5th ed. 305.
In Angell & Ames on Corp., 3d ed., page 28, it is laid down
that, while private corporations, being created by an act of the
Legislature, which is regarded as a contract, the Legislature cannot
constitutionally impair it, by annexing new terms and conditions
onerous in their operation, or inconsistent with a liberal construction
of the grant. The Legislature, as the trustee of the public interests, has the exclusive and unrestrained control over public corporations, and, acting as such, as it may create, so it may modify or
destroy, as public exigency requires or recommends, or the public
interests will be best subserved.
Here, in 1849, was the town of North Yarmouth, owning certain
flats and sedge banks, which had been conveyed to the town by the
proprietors in 1745, for the use of the inhabitants. "The inhabitants of every town in this State are declared to be a body politic
and corporate by the statute, but these corporations derive none of
their powers from, nor are any duties imposed upon them by the
common law. They have been denominated quasi corporations,
and their whole capacities, powers and duties are derived from
legislative enactments." iHooper vs. Emery, 14 Maine, 377.
If the Legislature had seen fit, by merely changing the lines of
the town, to transfer the inhabitants of North Yarmouth into another town, without any provision preserving their former rights as
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such inhabitants, it could have done so. The Legislature has
authority to change the boundaries of towns at pleasure. Ham vs.
Sawyer, 38 Maine, 41. But towns cannot change their boundaries.
Freeman vs. .enney, 15 Pick. 44.
The Legislature, if it had seen fit, might have wholly abolished
the town of North Yarmouth, for towns exist at the pleasure of the
Legislature, and not at their own pleasure; (Gorham vs. Springfield, 21 Maine, 61;) and in that case these flats and sedge banks,
mentioned in the case at bar, would have been subject to the disposition of the Legislature.
But we have seen that the Legislature, though having the power,
did not deprive the town of North Yarmouth of its rights to these
banks and common lands Though it had drawn a line through the
towh, yet it provided that those residing within the limits of the old
town should retain their rights to this common property, the same
as though no line had been drawn, and no new name given.
Where a town owns property, it is entirely. within the .province
of the Legislature, upon dividing that town, to provide as to the
enjoyment of that property. Brewster vs..Harwich, 4 Mass. 278 ;
_andolph vs. Braintree,4 Mass. 315; Uarrison vs; Bridgtom
16 Mass. 16; Windham vs. Portland,4 Mass. 384; Minot vs.
Curtis, 8 Mass. 441; Brunswick vs. Dunning, 7 Mass. 445;
REampshire vs. Franklin, 16 Mass. 86.
The effect of legislative action changing the boundaries of towns,
upon the property, rights and privileges of its inhabitants, are succinctly stated in this last case cited, where the court held the following language:- "By general principles of law, as well as by
judicial construction of statutes, if a part of the territory and inhabitants of a town are separated from it, by annexation to another,
or by the erection of a new corporation, the remaining part of the
town, or the former corporation, retains all its property, powers,
rights and privileges, and remains subject to all its obligations and
duties, unless some express provisionto the contrary should be made
by the act authorizing the separation."
By a reference to the cases, it will be found that where the Legis1ature, in altering town lines or erecting new corporations, have
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made no provision as to the enjoyment of the property of the old
corporation, that property remains in the old corporation; but
where, in the act of alteration or separation, the Legislature have, in
terms, prescribed the mode in which- this property shall be enjoyed,
their action is conclusive.
The question, then, is, did the Legislature, in the act of August,
1849, make such a provision as gives to the town of Yarmouth the
right to enjoy the property which belonged to North Yarmouth, at
the time Yarmouth was erected out of it?
The provisions of the fifth section of the act of August, 1849, are
plain. By that section, the town of Yarmouth is to enjoy these
,common lands, that before the division belonged to North Yarmouth,
the same as if no division had been made. If the Legislature had
*the power-to make provision in regard to the enjoyment of this common property, the fifth section clearly gives the right to Yarmouth
to enjoy this property.
The cases already cited show, that had the Legislature seen fit,
in the act of separation, to have provided that the inhabitants of
Yarmouth should exclusively be entitled to the use of these lands
which lie in her limits, it could have legally done so.
When, then, the Legislature said to the town of North Yarmouth,
"we will call a part of you Yarmouth, but the rights of all the inhabitants to enjoy the common property, wherever situate, shall be
preserved," the interests of the town of North Yarmouth were sufficiently consulted, and they should be content with the exclusive
rights which, under the circumstances of that case, the court felt
compelled to give them by their decision in the 84th of Maine, and
suffer the defendant quietly to enjoy those rights which, but for a
legislative line, as an inhabitant of North Yarmouth, he would have
been entitled to. The opinion of the court was delivered by
MAY, J.-Trespass quare clausum against the defendant, an
inhabitant of the town of Yarmouth, for breaking into and entering
upon certain flats, or sedge banks, situate in said town of Yarmouth,
and cutting the grass growing thereon. The alleged act of trespass
is admitted, but the defendant justifies it as the servant of said town
of Yarmouth, and as an inhabitant thereof, and also as having been
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an inhabitant of the town of North Yarmouth before and at the time
when that part of it on which he now lives was incorporated into the
town of Yarmouth.
The incorporation of Yarmouth was August 8, 1849, and it is
admitted that the whole title to the locus in quo was in the town of
North Yarmouth up to that time, and still is, unless it has been
affected by the act incorporating said town of Yarmouth. The territory composing the new town was taken wholly from the town of
North Yarmouth, and the act of incorporation provides that "the
inhabitants of said towns shall continue to hold and enjoy in common all the rights and privileges hitherto belonging to the inhabitants of North Yarmouth, in any and all public landings, cemeteries,
gravel-pits, muscle-beds, flalts and fisheries of every kind, within the
limits of said towns." Private Laws of 1849, c. 264, § 5.
The deed under or through which the plaintiffs claim the flats or
sedge banks upon which the defendant entered, bears date May 25,
1743. A copy or record of it, found upon -an ancient book of
records, purporting to be the book of records of the original proprietors of the town of North Yarmouth, is.made a part of the case,
It recites, among other things, "that, in consideration-of the sum
of five shillings, paid us by Messieurs Cornelius Soul, Jonas Mason
and Edward King, selectmen and trustees of said town of North
Yarmouth, there be and hereby are given, granted and sold to the
said Cornelius Soul, Jonas Mason, and Edward-King, selectmen and
trustees as aforesaid, in behalf of, and for the sole use, benefit and
behoof of the present inhabitants of said town of North Yarmouth,
and of all such as may or shall forever hereafter inhabit and dwell
in the said town, all and singular the fiats, sedge banks, muscle
beds, and all other conveniences whatsoever in the said town of
North Yarmouth, lying and being below high water mark, with all
the privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging, (except the salt
marshes on Small Point,) to be by the said inhabitants forever
hereafter held, used, occupied and improved in common; and that
all and every the said inhabitants shall and may forever hereafter
have free and fall liberty to graze, feed, cut rock weed, and dig all
sorts of shell-fish, on or by any other way or means to use and improve the said granted premises," &c. Whether this original deed
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is to be regarded as a conveyance to the three individuals therein
named, or to the town of North Yarmouth, as a municipal corporation, it is not now material to inquire. It is apparent, from the
whole phraseology of the deed, that it was intended by the proprietors of the territory of North Yarmouth, as a conveyance in trust,
for the benefit of those persons individually who then were or might
subsequently be inhabitants of the town of North Yarmouth. The
idea that that town might subsequently be cut up into several distinct towns, having other corporate names, did not probably occur
to the grantors. Their purpose undoubtedly was to grant the specific rights and privileges referred to in the deed, for the use of
such inhabitants as then lived upon, or should afterwards, in all
coming time, reside upon the territory of which they had been, or
'were then, the proprietors, and which they had conveyed, or might
subsequently convey, to their grantees within the limits of their
propriety. But whether the rights and privileges to be enjoyed, so
far as the intention of the grantors can be gathered from the deed,
were intended to be incident to and dependent upon a residence
within the limits of the town of North Yarmouth, as they then
existed, or as they might afterwards be made to exist, it may not be
essential to determine, because the case finds that the whole-legal
estate was in the town of North Yarmouth at the time when that
portion of its territory was incorporated into the new town of Yrrmouth, upon which the defendant resides. A construction that
should regard all persons resident within the old town when the new
town was incorporated, as cestuis que trust, under the original
grant, cannot be deemed -inequitable; and if so, whether it was
competent for the Legislature to cut off any portion of the cestuis
que trust from the enjoyment of their individual rights and privileges without their consent, would deserve grave consideration.
-In the case before us they have not attempted to do so. The
whole purpose of section five of the act incorporating the town of
Yarmouth, before recited, was to secure to the inhabitants of both
towns the continuance and enjoyment of the same rights and privileges, in regard to all public landings, cemeteries, gravel-pits, muscle
beds, fiats and fisheries which they had before enjoyed in common,
within the limits of said towns ; and it is conceded by the learned
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counsel for the plaintiffs, that if the legislature had the constitutional authority to enact that section, and the same is valid and
binding, then the plaintiffs cannot prevail.
The law is now well settled that, "in respect to public corporations which exist only for public purposes, as counties, cities and
towns, the legislature, under proper limitations, have a right to
change, modify, enlarge or restrain them, securing, however, the
property for the uses of those for whom it was purchased." 2 Kent's
Com. 305; Angell & Ames on Corp., 3d ed., page 28, and authorities there cited; and such has been the uniform practice of the
legislature of this State, from its earliest existence. And the reason why this power exists, is because the acts by which such corporations are created are not contracts within the meaning of the constitution of the United States, or of the constitution of this State.
The public good evidently requires that such corporations should be
subject to legislative control. The legislature, therefore, as the
trustee of the public interests, is properly invested with unrestrained
power over the existence of all public corporations.
It is also well settled that towns are public corporations. Inhabitants of GorLam vs. -Inhabitants of Springfteld, 21 Maine, 61, and
the authorities cited in defence fully establish the position that,
where a town owns property, or is liable for outstanding debts, it is
within the province of the legislature, at the time of the division of
any such town, or the incorporation of a new town out of a part of
its territory, to provide for an equitable appropriation or enjoyment
of such property by the inhabitants of the old and new towns, or to
impose upon each the payment of a share of the corporate debts.
The exercise of this power, in this State and iassachusetts, has
been so long continued, and so frequent, and so often acted upon by
the highest judicial tribunals, as within the legitimate scope of legislative authority, that we feel no hesitancy in coming to the conclusion that the exercise of such power is constitutional and valid.
It is true that, without some legislative action in relation to the
property and existing liabilities of the old town, upon its division,
or the incorporation of a new town out of its territory, the old town
will be entitled to the entire property, and solely answerable for
ouch liabiiitics. It is said by Parsons, C. J., in the case of the
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Inhabitants of Windham vs. Inhabitantsof Portland,4 Mass. 384,
that "a town incorporated may acquire property, real or personal;
it enjoys co porate rights and privileges, and is subject to obligations and duties. If a part of its territory and inhabitants are
separated from it by annexation to another, or by the erection of a
new corporation, the former corporation still retains all its property,
powers, rights and privileges, and remains subject to all its obligations and duties, unless some new provision should be made by the
art authorizing the separation." The same doctrine is reiterated
by C. J. Parker, in the case of the Inhabitantsof Hampshirecounty
vs. Inhabitants of Franklin county, 16 Mass. 86.'
In the present case, such new provision seems to have been made,
and made, too, in terms plainly indicative of the legislative will i
that this defendant, and all others resident within the limits of North
Yarmouth, as it then existed, should continue to enjoy, so far as
relates to the flats and sedge banks in question, the rights and privileges to which he had been accustomed prior to the incorporation
of the new town of Yarmouth.
We do not -find, in view of the fact, that the town of North Yarmouth, at the time -of the incorporation of Yarmouth, held these
flats and sedge banks in trust, solely for its own inhabitants, any
thing which prevented the legislature from providing by law, upon
the separation, that all the inhabitants of both towns should enjoy
the rights and privileges to which they were then entitled as cestuis
que trust, in the same manner as if no separation had taken place;
or, in other words, we see nothing in the circumstances that could
restrain the legislature from providing that, for the purposes of justice and equity, both towns should be regarded as North Yarmouth,
so far as should be necessary in order to give efficacy to all the
rights and privileges to which all ihe inhabitants were then entitled,
and would have continued to be entitled by virtue of the trust, if
the new town had not been created. And this is in effect what has
been done. For the enjoyment of these rights and privileges, provision was made that the tenancy in common which'- then existed,
under the trust, between the inhabitants upon the whole territory of
both towns,, should continue in the same manner as if no, separation
had occurred. So far, then, as the act of incorporation of the new

